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1. Introduction 
This article seeks to uncover the ideational underpin-
nings of AK Party foreign policy, on the grounds that 
this is a time of extraordinary flux in Near Eastern poli-
tics, and that at times of such flux the will and intent of 
political actors gains particular salience. It is clearly the 
case—as the growing body of theoretically sophisticat-
ed literature on the subject recognizes—that as a dem-
ocratically elected government, the AK Party leadership 
has had to craft its foreign policies within the context 
of an interplay between several sets of structural 
frameworks. Externally, it has naturally been subject to 
the opportunities and constraints imposed by the re-
gional and global distribution of power. Internally, it 
has needed to be responsive to popular opinion—
including the growing assertion of diverse identities 
among an increasingly politically mobilized popula-
tion—as well as the demands of emergent interest 
groups and social classes associated with the transition 
from a statist import-substituting to a neoliberal ex-
port-oriented economy. It has also had to deal with an 
institutional framework (especially the security and ju-
dicial bureaucracies) in which its ideological adver-
saries have long been entrenched. 
A focus on systemic constraints, accordingly, can 
usefully highlight strategic continuities that transcend 
the varying political and ideological inclinations of par-
ticular governments (Gözen, 2010; Oğuzlu, 2010; Özek 
& Oğuzlu, 2013). When the Soviet Union assumed a 
dramatically more aggressive posture in 1945, for ex-
ample, the magnitude of the geopolitical threat 
eclipsed the inward-looking and neutralist inclinations 
of the governing Republican People’s Party (CHP), and 
prompted a rapid alliance with the Western powers. If 
Russia were to adopt a similarly aggressive posture to-
day, one would expect the AK Party leadership to react 
in parallel fashion, aligning its policies much more 
closely in line with those of the United States and 
NATO than it might currently prefer. By the same to-
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ken, however, such a focus will be less useful in situa-
tions where long-standing continuities break down, 
where the configuration of threats is not as clear, and 
where there is therefore no consensus on what consti-
tutes an optimal response—such as the impasse 
reached on the Iraqi Kurdish issue by 2008, or the out-
break of the Arab Spring in 2011—so that it does mat-
ter which particular leadership, with its distinct values 
and outlooks, is in office. In both cases, it seems likely 
that a CHP government, for example, would have 
adopted significantly different policies. For this reason, 
while the imbalance between Turkish and Russian geo-
political power obviously goes a long way towards ex-
plaining the AK Party government’s muted response to 
challenges such as the 2008 Russian-Georgian war 
(Kardaş, 2013, pp. 648, 654-655) or the 2014 Russian 
occupation of Crimea, and its preference for non-
confrontational trade-oriented relations instead (İşeri 
& Dilek, 2011), in a world in which even the most sta-
ble dynamics are occasionally upended there is value in 
knowing how a particular leadership would act if freed 
from its usual constraints. 
Similarly, analyses that focus on Turkey’s neoliberal 
turn—whether positively (Keyman, 2009, 2010; Kirişci, 
2009, 2012; Kutlay, 2011) or critically (Uzgel, 2009; 
Yalvaç, 2012)—do much to explicate the apparently 
desecuritized, economistic and integrationist features of 
Turkish behavior, encapsulated in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s 
concept of a “zero problems” foreign policy, and generat-
ed (it is argued) by socioeconomic dynamics that trans-
cend the role of the AK Party. Here as well, however, 
there is a danger of unduly reified theories getting 
mugged by rapidly changing realities (Kirişci, 2011, p. 46), 
as evidenced by the recent proliferation of problems be-
tween Turkey and many of its neighbors. Davutoğlu, him-
self, after all, has warned that those “who narrowly focus 
on the ‘zero problems’ principle miss Turkey’s greater 
foreign-policy vision”, pointing out that it has less to do 
with “advancing economic and security interests” than 
with bringing about “Turkey’s reintegration with its 
neighbors” (Davutoğlu, 2013, March 21). 
This article’s concern with the AK Party’s “greater 
foreign-policy vision” aligns it with those analyses, fi-
nally, that hone in on the ideational dimension in the 
interplay of Turkish foreign policy determinants (Aras & 
Fidan, 2009; Balcı, 2010; Bozdağlıoğlu, 2008; Mufti, 
2009; Yanık, 2011). Here again, the challenge is to 
avoid assigning normative or cultural structures such 
determinative power that they obscure consequential 
variations in outlook that grow especially salient at crit-
ical transitional junctures. One study that does rise to 
this challenge is by Bilgin and Bilgiç, who point out that 
while the AK Party is not the first Turkish leadership to 
utilize geopolitical discourse in justifying its foreign pol-
icies, it is the first to do so by casting Turkey as the 
leader of its own distinct Islamic “civilizational basin” 
(Bilgin & Bilgiç, 2011, p. 191). Published just as the 
2011 Arab upheavals were getting underway, however, 
their article does not have the opportunity to explore 
the more hegemonistic implications of AK Party geo-
politics. Two years later, Duran’s equally nuanced anal-
ysis likewise recognizes the distinctiveness of the AK 
Party’s “civilizational discourse”, and goes on to note 
the shift from an emphasis on “Europeanization” in its 
first half-decade in office, to the growing prominence 
of “Islamic themes” especially after the outbreak of the 
Arab Spring. Even in this second phase, however, its 
foreign policy is still described as aiming to avoid polar-
ization and conflict, and continuing to privilege trade 
relations instead (Duran, 2013, pp. 93, 95). 
The objective of this study, accordingly, is to show 
that AK Party leaders have long maintained a distinc-
tive hegemonistic vision wherein Turkey takes the lead 
in constructing a reintegrated regional political com-
munity—the precise features of which remain un-
clear—with a shared normative (Islamic) and historical 
(Ottoman) identity, organized to provide political rep-
resentation in line with contemporary criteria of legit-
imacy and consent, and eschewing idealism in favor of 
realpolitik in order to aim for a position of “greatness” 
in the international system. This objective will be pur-
sued first of all through a survey of the relevant 
speeches and writings of key AK Party figures since the 
early 1990s. Because their ideological vision, like that 
of any government, is subject to the usual structural 
and political constraints outlined above, however, the 
second element of the methodology employed will be 
to correlate the degree of the AK Party’s relative au-
tonomy domestically with the various phases of its for-
eign policy. By demonstrating that the more freedom 
of action the AK Party leaders have enjoyed since com-
ing to power, the more their foreign policy rhetoric and 
practice have conformed to their early 1990s dis-
course, this approach will confirm the accuracy of the 
“Islamic realist” neo-Ottoman vision ascribed to them 
here, while at the same time still giving proper due to 
the ongoing constraining effects of structural factors. 
Such an approach can thus explain the apparent in-
congruity between the pre- and post-2008 phases of 
AK Party governance, and provide a response to the 
liberal call for a renewed focus on domestic reform—
illustrated by Nathalie Tocci’s proposition that “rather 
than being blinded by ambitions of grandeur, Turkey 
must realize that its value added in the neighborhood 
largely hinges on its ongoing domestic transformation” 
(Tocci, 2012, p. 212)—by showing that far from contra-
dicting each other, the AK Party’s reformist agenda at 
home and its increasingly assertive policies abroad, like 
the “soft” and “hard” power elements of its foreign 
policy, actually go hand in hand. In the process, it will 
become possible to identify the real theoretical and 
practical pitfalls confronting its attempt to grapple with 
the pressures of globalized liberalism—the broader 
ideational/normative framework in which Western 
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democracy is grounded, and from which (as will be de-
tailed in the next section) the AK Party leaders have 
tried to distinguish their own general outlook. 
2. Origins 
Speaking at a conference in 1992, Abdullah Gül, a 
member of parliament for the Islamist Refah (Welfare) 
Party, delivered a succinct articulation of the vision 
that would eventually lead him and some colleagues to 
break away and found the AK Party, and propel him to 
the presidency of the republic. He began by asserting 
that Turkey was undergoing a “systemic crisis” brought 
about by the incompatibility between Islam and the ex-
isting political regime (Gül, 1993, p. 117). Islam pro-
vides the basis of “our moral values” and hence of the 
shared “identity” of the peoples who had been peace-
fully “integrated” under its banner for centuries (Gül, 
1993, pp. 116-117, 119). For the last seventy years, 
however, he added, Turkey has been ruled by an au-
thoritarian regime—similar in many ways to its coun-
terparts in Iraq, Syria and Libya—whose values are con-
trary to the values of, and consequently maintains a 
posture of “enmity” toward, its own people. Gül fo-
cused on the two principles of this regime’s “official 
ideology” impinging most directly on political identity: 
on Secularism, described as an “enmity” toward reli-
gion that naturally “alienates” a populace “kneaded to-
gether” by Islamic beliefs and values; and on National-
ism, which alienates people still further by promoting a 
Turkishness that takes the form of “racism” (ırkçılık) 
and fails to reflect their actual diversity (Gül, 1993, pp. 
118, 119-120). He did not go into the factors that cata-
lyzed Turkey’s “systemic crisis” at this precise point in 
time, but for whatever reasons the authoritarian secu-
lar-nationalist ideology had apparently run its course. 
The most obvious sign was the fact that a part of the 
population which had long lived harmoniously as part 
of this community (millet), had now embarked on a 
“separatist struggle”. The Kurdish uprising signals that 
the Kemalist regime is no longer capable of providing 
for the moral and material well-being of its citizens, or 
“even of preserving their unity” (Gül, 1993, p. 118). 
This last point led Gül to introduce a new theme, 
alongside Islamic unity and political representation: 
greatness. He lambasted Turkey’s dominant elites for 
clinging to a defunct ideology and a bankrupt regime 
even at the cost of dividing and “diminishing” the 
country. Abandoning that ideology and regime could 
not only preserve existing unity, it could bring into be-
ing “a new conception” based on Islamic values that 
would extend to embrace our kinfolk “from Bosnia…all 
the way to China”. For this reason, Gül concluded, the 
recent emergence of “neo-Ottoman” arguments was a 
“very healthy” development (Gül, 1993, pp. 124, 125). 
He elaborated on this theme eight years later: 
There are two conceptions in Turkey. The first is an 
inward-looking conception that considers Turkey 
exclusively within its borders...that has severed all 
links to its history...[t]hat might have been appro-
priate at a certain juncture…but not to current re-
alpolitik conditions…The second conception argues 
that there are certain realities. Turkey governed 
this region for so many centuries. It has great po-
tential…History, geography, current events, all 
oblige us not to ignore [what is happening with] the 
Turks in Russia, the Circassians, Bulgarians, even in 
China. I am among those who subscribe to this sec-
ond conception. (Gül, 2000) 
Gül’s advocacy of an expansive outlook as a corollary of 
Islamic identity and representation—all part of the 
“neo-Ottoman” idea introduced by Turgut Özal during 
his tenure as Turkey’s prime minister and then presi-
dent between 1983 and 1993 (Mufti, 2009, especially 
pp. 49-84)—found an echo in another young reformist 
within the Welfare Party, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In an 
interview published in 1993, one year after Gül’s con-
ference speech, Erdoğan defined democracy as the 
manifestation of the people’s will. While as such it is 
obviously “a fine thing”, it is not an end (amaç) in itself 
but “merely a means” (araç)—a mechanism for insti-
tuting any kind of regime the people want (Erdoğan, 
1993, p. 419). This statement has since repeatedly 
been condemned as an expression of Erdoğan’s oppor-
tunistic use of democratic means for undemocratic 
ends. The distinction between political means and 
ends, however, is hardly novel. Political thinkers ex-
tending back to the medieval period and beyond have 
categorized regimes on the basis of their different 
ends. Al-Farabi (d. 950 CE), for example, following Aris-
totle, identified domination as the characteristic end of 
tyrannical regimes; wealth as the characteristic end of 
oligarchic regimes; honor as the characteristic end of 
timocratic regimes; and freedom as the principle of 
democratic regimes, reflecting the multiplicity of char-
acter types and their various different ends accommo-
dated by democracies. 
Erdoğan was and is a politician, not a philosopher, 
so it is unreasonable to extrapolate a political theory 
from his public statements. Even in this short inter-
view, for example, he seems to contradict himself on 
the subject of majoritarianism, suggesting at one point 
that if the people decide democratically in favor of a 
“totalitarian regime, we must respect that” (but quickly 
adding that if they want to overthrow such a regime, 
they must be able to do that as well), then at another 
point insisting that whereas democracy allows 51% of 
the population to dominate the other 49%, “in our 
opinion, even 99% have no right to dominate 1%” 
(Erdoğan, 1993, pp. 420, 432). Nevertheless, it is evi-
dent that he is here trying to balance an affirmation of 
representation with a concern about the higher ends to 
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be promoted in a democracy. So what might those 
higher ends be? Some clues may be gleaned from 
Erdoğan’s critique of one particular regime which takes 
up the bulk of his interview. 
Erdoğan described the ideology of this regime as a 
“rigid unitarist conception” with “Kemalism as its reli-
gion”. Its stunted and repressive outlook had plunged 
the Turkish economy into continuous decline, “from 
sixth place in the world in 1923, to 46th today”; in-
duced moral collapse; stifled intellectual progress; and 
compromised both internal and external security 
(Erdoğan, 1993, pp. 421-422). Echoing Gül, Erdoğan 
explained that national unity could never be secured by 
a “racist official ideology” which insisted that “Turkey is 
for the Turks” and failed to recognize the “27 ethnic 
groups currently living in the Turkish Republic”. The re-
gime that governed on the basis of such an ideology had, 
as a result, “reached a dead end, had begun to decom-
pose, and was emitting disturbing odors…There is no 
question of Kemalism rejuvenating itself” (Erdoğan, 
1993, p. 425). Pressed by the interviewer on whether he 
therefore believed that the Kurds had a right to break 
away and form their own state, Erdoğan argued that 
Kurdish rights could be secured within a framework of 
“shared faith” and “something resembling the Ottoman 
states system” (Erdoğan, 1993, p. 422). 
Like Gül before him, then, Erdoğan’s alternative to 
what he described as the defunct authoritarian secular-
nationalist order of Kemalism was a polity held togeth-
er by the shared moral values and overarching identity 
of Islam. In distinguishing his understanding of Islamic 
politics from more liberal concepts of “transformation” 
and democratization, moreover, he criticized the latter 
as impositions of “American imperialism” appealing on-
ly to those enamored by the “Westernization process”, 
and expressed his resentment at the paternalism of the 
“Christian” powers which “insistently promote instabil-
ity and incapacity in Muslim countries” (Erdoğan, 1993, 
pp. 427, 428-429, 431). The driving animus of his ar-
gument, in other words, the higher end at which it 
aims, is the status of his proposed Islamic polity rela-
tive to the existing powers of the world, and it is this 
concern with status or greatness that led him, as it led 
Abdullah Gül, to look back to Islam’s imperial glory 
days in search of an alternative to the narrow, West-
ern-inspired, Kemalist nation-state: “Turkey has the 
power to sustain an imperial vision. In fact, if Turkey 
wants to take its place as a prestigious member of the 
global community in the 2000s (and it should), then it 
is obliged to adopt an imperial vision. The rationales 
for this obligation lie in its history, its geography, its 
ethnic composition” (Erdoğan, 1993, p. 430). 
Islamic political thought has always accommodated 
a wide variety of perspectives, and one of the most 
prominent dichotomies within it has been between 
what may be called an “idealist” outlook—focusing on 
Islamic law as an easily comprehensible and imple-
mentable blueprint for human perfectibility, whether 
on an individual or communal level, here on earth—
and a more “realist” conception which is much more 
dubious about the capacity of fallible and contentious 
human beings to reach consensus on the interpretation 
of divine law, which therefore accords much greater 
importance to human reasoning and political skill, and 
which is consequently much more interested in rela-
tively successful, albeit still necessarily imperfect, actu-
ally existing political regimes. This dichotomy remains 
in evidence today. Whereas virtually all Muslims view 
the earliest years of Islam as a period of divinely-
inspired virtuous governance, for example (though 
they may disagree on how long that pristine age last-
ed), few Islamists today—whether conservative or mili-
tantly revolutionary—look to the subsequent imperial 
era, from the rise of the Umayyads to the fall of the Ot-
tomans, for political models. Even the Muslim Brother-
hood, which has been moving toward increasingly 
pragmatic positions on political governance, draws lit-
tle inspiration from the imperial age that constitutes 
the vast bulk of Islamic history. Herein lies the distinc-
tive realism of AK Party leaders such as Gül and 
Erdoğan. Their energies focused more on mundane 
questions—such as how to aggregate the interests of 
Turks, Kurds, and others within a unified political struc-
ture—than on abstract considerations of human per-
fectibility in preparation for the afterlife, they are ac-
cordingly much more open to the lessons and legacies 
of human history in all its imperfections.  
A similar concern with politics as it is actually prac-
ticed informs the thought of Ahmet Davutoğlu, a politi-
cal scientist who became chief adviser to the prime 
minister after the AK Party’s first electoral victory in 
November 2002, was then appointed foreign minister 
in May 2009, and became prime minister himself after 
Erdoğan's election to the presidency in August 2014. At 
around the same time of the Gül speech and Erdoğan 
interview outlined above, Davutoğlu published a book 
entitled Alternative Paradigms asserting the “irrecon-
cilability” of Islamic and Western political worldviews. 
In the dominant (and especially liberal) currents of the 
Western tradition, he argued, the “deification of man” 
reaches such an extent that it alienates the individual 
both from the rest of society and from the state, so 
that interpersonal relations take the form of a struggle 
for individual, primarily material, self-aggrandizement. 
The Islamic worldview, by contrast, is characterized by 
the “subordination of economics to politics”, a prefer-
ence for stability and order as opposed to what 
Davutoğlu considered the West’s Machiavellian inclina-
tion toward a more competitive or “dynamic” politics, 
an “equalitarian-solidarist” view of social relations 
based on “cooperation” rather than “socio-economic 
stratification”, and a “concentration of power through 
institutional centralization” as opposed to an “institu-
tional pluralism based on the socio-economic disper-
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sion of material power” (Davutoğlu, 1994a, pp. 12, 39, 
153; see also p. 103). 
Davutoğlu acknowledged that “the pressure of new 
world forces and the political experience of European na-
tions” have helped in “impressing on the mind of modern 
Islam” that a “republican spirit” and government through 
representative “legislative assemblies” are “the only pos-
sible form” that the old Islamic ideal of consensus (ijma`) 
“can take in modern times” (Davutoğlu, 1994a, p. 133). 
While insisting that Islam’s distinctive features rule out 
any automatic “transfer of…Western procedural means 
of political legitimation” (Davutoğlu, 1994a, p. 198), 
therefore, Davutoğlu—like Erdoğan—was clearly trying 
to articulate what he viewed as an Islamically-grounded 
concept of representative government that avoids the 
shortcomings of Western liberalism. This effort came at 
a critical juncture in a broader evolution of Turkish Is-
lamist ideas about democracy and the role of religion in 
governance. 
The evolution itself began in the 1960s when a 
wave of Turkish translations of books on Islam from all 
across the world sparked a revival in Islamic political 
thought (Çalışlar, 1995, p. 76). This was followed by the 
founding in January 1970 of Turkey’s first explicitly Is-
lamist party, the National Order Party, which already in 
its founding charter called for a “synthesis” of Islamic 
moral values and a “democratic” political system 
(Sarıbay, 1985, p. 101). It quickly became clear, howev-
er, that serious ambiguities remained between label 
and content. Thus a 1975 book by the new party’s 
leader, Necmettin Erbakan, called for further populist 
reforms such as adoption of a presidential system with 
the president chosen by the people, abolition of the 
Senate, public referenda on important political issues, 
and a jury system in the courts (Erbakan, 1975, pp. 30, 
44-45). At the same time, Erbakan contrasted his no-
tion of democracy with liberalism, which he described 
as inspired by an exploitative capitalism that sacrifices 
the interests of the community to individual greed. He 
also underscored his illiberalism by attacking the Euro-
pean Union for seeking to turn Turkey into a “colony” 
as part of a “Zionist” conspiracy, rooted in the Torah, 
for global control (Erbakan, 1975, pp. 25, 28, 43, 238, 
249, 250-251). For Erbakan, then, the attraction of de-
mocracy lay primarily in its utility at mobilizing religious 
populism against Turkey’s Kemalist establishment. 
Even so, already at this early stage concerns were 
raised about such an embrace of democracy, no matter 
how opportunistic. Selahaddin E. Çakırgil, a writer close 
to Erbakan’s party, warned in 1976: “There is an Islam-
ist movement in Turkey today. This movement…is seek-
ing, and finding, legal avenues for its emergence…but 
the question of whether it will be the principles of de-
mocracy, or the principles of our worldview, which will 
be used as the method for solving our problems, is now 
confronting us as a serious internal contradic-
tion…Otherwise, while we’re saying ‘let’s use democra-
cy’, democracy will transform us in its image” (Sarıbay, 
1985, pp. 222-223). Such concerns led to a split during 
the mid-1980s. Some Islamists repudiated democracy al-
together, but the dominant current—responding to con-
temporary realities, just as Çakırgil had warned—came 
to see themselves as “Muslim democrats” (Çakır, 1994, 
pp. 112, 113, 115). As one of the participants in these 
debates, Bahri Zengin, later remembered, those who 
balked at defending freedom of opinion—because it 
would mean defending the rights of communists as 
well—ended up outnumbered by those accepting that 
they should “defend this not as a tactic” but as a genuine 
“component of our values” (Çalışlar, 1995, pp. 80-81). 
An instructive example of this evolution can be 
seen in the writings of the Islamist intellectual Ali Bu-
laç. Looking for a model in the “Medina Constitution” 
implemented by the Prophet Muhammad and ratified 
by the various communities of that multi-religious first 
capital of Islam, Bulaç in 1992 affirmed the principles of 
pluralism, legal and cultural autonomy for every reli-
gious and ethnic group, and a participatory politics in 
which the executive authority acts more as “referee” 
than “ruler”. He accordingly argued that the Constitu-
tion stood “above” the Qur’an, Torah, and various local 
customs because the Islamic community (ümmet) of 
that time was a “political union” in which Muslims, 
Jews and polytheists coexisted (Bulaç, 1992). At the 
same time, like Davutoğlu, Bulaç resisted identifying 
this Islamic model with Western liberalism. In a 1993 
book, he described the latter as unwieldy, character-
ized by an inordinate “competitiveness” that is a prod-
uct of the West’s distinctive history, and ineffective at 
achieving justice and distribution of rights (Bulaç, 1993, 
pp. 22, 33, 39, 63-65). Eight year later, however, Bulaç 
had come around to a much more positive view. While 
still maintaining “our fundamental objection” to the 
Western Enlightenment’s excessive individualism, he 
called for a reconciliation between Islam as a religion 
and democracy as a “political regime”, asserting that it 
was indeed possible to speak of “Islamic democracy” 
(Bulaç, 2001, pp. 9, 34, 111). This was because the in-
evitable multiplicity of interpretations ruled out any 
undisputed application of divine law. The “fundamen-
tal question”, Bulaç concluded, was: 
In whose name do those who govern us govern? In 
the name of God? No. Because the governors are 
not God’s representatives. In whose name does the 
president of the republic or the mayor of Istanbul, 
for example, govern us? In our name. Who gave 
this authority to the president or the mayor? We 
gave them the authority to govern us. In that case 
we can say: in a proper political arrangement, the 
right to practice sovereignty and to transfer author-
ity belongs to the community (ümmet), to the peo-
ple. (Bulaç, 2011, pp. 41, 60) 
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As will be shown presently, this accommodation of de-
mocracy would prove about as far as Bulaç would go in 
reconciling his ideals with the imperatives of realpolitik. 
It was at such a juncture in the evolution of Islamist 
views on democracy, at any rate, that Ahmet 
Davutoğlu’s 1994 book appeared. In line with the 
emerging consensus, he was prepared to accept the in-
stitutional mechanisms of representation developed by 
the Western democracies. Again in line with that con-
sensus, however, he saw little tension between the 
rights of the individual and the requirements of the 
state: “The aim of the state is the fulfillment of justice 
on behalf of Allah on earth…The perfection of the indi-
vidual is connected to the fulfillment of this mission by 
an ideal state in the writings of several Muslim schol-
ars” (Davutoğlu, 1994a, p. 107). Beyond assigning the 
state a higher and more central role in human self-
realization than it plays in liberal Western political 
thought, moreover, Davutoğlu also defined it different-
ly, rejecting the “nation-state” as “a purely Western ar-
tifact” in favor of an overarching, multicultural “Islamic 
polity” capable of serving “as an alternative world-
system” (Davutoğlu, 1994a, pp. 165, 202). In a second 
book published in 1994, he elaborated on this distinctive 
Islamic state system: “This will encourage Muslims to re-
vitalize traditional concepts such as the Ummah univer-
sal brotherhood, Dâr al-Islâm as a world order and the 
Caliphate as the political institutionalization of this world 
order. It is not necessary to have the traditional forms of 
these institutions” (Davutoğlu, 1994b, p. 113). 
Davutoğlu’s greatest impact, however, came with 
his third book, Strategic Depth, published in 2001. Alt-
hough he would later shy away from the label “neo-
Ottomanism” because of its expansionist connotations, 
Davutoğlu made it clear here that his objection to 
“Özal’s neo-Ottomanist line” lay primarily in the “jour-
nalistic level” at which it remained due to its “theoretical 
underdevelopment” (Davutoğlu, 2007, p. 90). Instead, 
he proposed to expose, rigorously and systematically, 
the “most fundamental contradiction” in Turkish foreign 
policy: the “historic break” between Turkey’s imperial 
past as the “political center of its civilizational envi-
ronment” and its current structure as a “nation-state”. 
The reason for this break was the desire of the post-
Ottoman “political elite” to attach itself to “another 
civilizational environment”, the West (Davutoğlu, 2007, 
pp. 81-83). Under the guidance of these “identity-
lacking elites” (kimliksiz seçkinler), Turkish foreign poli-
cy had acquired a “defensive”, “reactive”, “cowardly”, 
and “timid” outlook that completely disengaged from 
all “the lands over which sovereignty had been lost”, 
and anxiously sought only to preserve the “new lines” 
of the Republic’s borders (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 33, 47, 
53). Because such a stance ignored—“arhythmically” 
and “aharmoniously”—the political-cultural resonances 
between the republican and imperial environments, 
Davutoğlu concluded (echoing Erdoğan and Gül), it 
would ultimately fail even to secure the existing status 
quo (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 117, 555). 
Instead, Turkey should adopt a strategic posture 
more in harmony with its historical legacy: one capable 
of transmuting its liabilities into power assets by “ven-
turing outwards with confidence and assertiveness” ra-
ther than closing in on itself; one that could enable its 
people to “write” rather than merely “read” their own 
“history” (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 11, 555, 560). Such a 
strategy would necessarily utilize a wide range of 
mechanisms, and Davutoğlu devoted considerable 
space in his book to the types of institutions through 
which Turkey could reengage with its geopolitical envi-
ronment. This institutional focus, coupled with 
Davutoğlu’s care—here, as well as subsequently in his 
career—to maintain a cooperative tone, has misled 
many readers into seeing him as an exponent of the 
liberal “post-security” school of international relations 
theory. A closer look at his treatment of the three main 
arenas of Turkish foreign policy, however, reveals a 
more complex picture. 
Toward the north, Davutoğlu called for a more “dy-
namic” and “audacious” (atak) stance, informed by one 
massive underlying reality: “the historic Otto-
man/Turkish—Russian/Soviet/Russian rivalry”. Such a 
stance need not be unduly provocative; indeed, it 
should recognize that there can periodically be periods 
of cooperation with Russia for common benefit or 
against a common threat (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 56, 240). 
But its overall thrust should aim at “balancing Russia’s 
influence over Central Asia and the Caucasus”, and even 
at “strengthening by stages the status of the North Cau-
casus republics inside the Russian Federation”. 
Davutoğlu left no doubts about the fundamentally con-
flictual nature of this agenda by noting that “the great-
est element in breaking Slavic and Russian influence in 
these regions is the counter-cultural resistance power 
provided by Islam” (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 181, 250). 
If its borders with the Russian sphere of influence 
formed Turkey’s primary geopolitical front line, the 
Middle East constituted its “indispensable hinterland” 
(Davutoğlu, 2007, p. 129). Turkey would need to build 
up this hinterland by neutralizing its rivals there, old 
(Iran) and new (Israel), and by restoring its traditional 
alliances—above all, with the Kurds and Arabs. In the 
case of the former, this would require the adoption of 
“a new cultural approach that encompasses all peo-
ples”, so that the Kurdish issue could go from being a 
liability that rendered Turkey “vulnerable to external 
pressures” to a power-projection asset in its own right 
(Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 442, 448). In the case of the lat-
ter, it meant reversing the “alienation” from the Arab 
world caused by “indexing” Turkey’s policies to Israeli 
interests (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 57, 415-416). 
As for the European arena, Davutoğlu advocated 
“actively” supporting formerly Ottoman Muslim com-
munities in the Balkans such as the Albanians and Bos-
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nians; safeguarding Turkey’s vital interests in Cyprus 
and the Aegean islands (where the prospect of war 
loomed largest because of the “unforgiveable errors” 
of the Kemalists in failing to formulate a “coherent na-
val strategy”); and playing the competing ambitions of 
the Russians, Germans, and Americans off against each 
other (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 122-123, 154, 235, 293-
294, 315-316, 528). A similar realpolitik logic character-
ized Davutoğlu’s discussion of the European Union, 
which is described as an element balancing both Amer-
ican and Russian power, so that the primary purpose of 
accession would be to maximize Turkey’s own room for 
strategic maneuver (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 520, 550). 
It becomes apparent, then, that Davutoğlu’s utiliza-
tion of language and concepts characteristic of liberal 
international relations theory obscures an underlying 
logic much more in line with realist—indeed, imperi-
al—conceptions. That this is true of his and his col-
leagues’ political worldview more generally, will be-
come clearer when we turn to the AK Party’s actual 
practice after it came to power in 2002.  
3. Consolidation Phase (2002–2008) 
In a book written after the AK Party assumed power, 
Ali Bulaç noted its apparently fully internalized espous-
al of democracy and—in line with the evolution of his 
own thought outlined above—agreed with it to some 
extent (Bulaç, 2010, pp. 350-351, 442). He worried, 
however, that by embracing designations such as “con-
servative” and “reformist” rather than “Islamic”, the 
new party intended to “set Islamism aside” in order to 
accommodate the “civilian-military bureaucracy, big 
capital…the United States and the European Union” 
(Bulaç, 2010, pp. 17-18, 50-51). Just three years after 
taking office, he complained, its materialistic policies had 
already created a corrupt environment that allowed cer-
tain coteries to “loot” public resources. If this was the 
model of reconciling “Islam and democracy” that the AK 
Party hoped to “market” to other countries, then it 
would be exporting “the empty and purposeless life 
style of a nihilistic culture” and thus “dragging…the Mid-
dle East and neighboring regions to suicide alongside 
Turkey” (Bulaç, 2010, pp. 208, 441-442).  
Bulaç found the AK Party’s foreign policy equally 
objectionable—especially its support for the “sav-
age…unjust and illegal” American war on Iraq, its coop-
eration with the American military campaign “against 
the Muslim Afghan people”, and its unwillingness to 
suspend “at least a few” of Turkey’s bilateral agree-
ments with Israel (Bulaç, 2010, pp. 126, 312, 407). Here 
as well, the AK Party was in danger of losing its moral 
grounding. All this, Bulaç argued, grew out of a “realist” 
outlook evident throughout the history of Islam—a 
“Real-Islam” (Reel İslam) that effaces the religion’s 
“life-giving values” (Bulaç, 2010, p. 52). An “excessive 
emphasis on realpolitik paves the way for the surren-
der of principle and justice to security, of the ideal to 
[contingent] conditions”. This is what had happened to 
the erstwhile Islamists of the AK Party, for whom “eve-
rything became politicized”: “Muslim intellectuals sud-
denly became state bureaucrats, and they all began to 
concern themselves with strategies for Turkey’s re-
gional leadership…[They] lost their autonomous and ci-
vilian character and came to resemble the Ottoman of-
ficial clergy (ulema)…This is the first of the greatest 
disasters to befall the Islamist movement” (Bulaç, 
2010, pp. 24, 450, 448). 
The AK Party’s early public discourse certainly ap-
peared to confirm such observations. Even before tak-
ing office as prime minister, Erdoğan told an audience 
in Washington that his party was “realistic and reform-
ist” and, while it “represents the common values” of 
Turkey’s “moderate Muslim population”, was not itself 
“based on religion”. He stressed that “democracy rep-
resents my belief in what type of government there 
should be” and that: “We favor free market economy. 
We are against state oriented approaches”. As for for-
eign policy, “a government under AK Party will make 
the Turkey–U.S. alliance stronger” (Erdoğan, 2002). Ac-
tion followed words, with AK Party parliamentarians 
voting on 1 March 2003 to cooperate with the United 
States in opening a northern front against Iraq—a reso-
lution that nevertheless failed due to opposition par-
liamentarians backed by Kemalist circles in the mili-
tary—and on 30 July 2003 to pass a landmark legal 
package that advanced democratization by curtailing 
the authority of the military-dominated National Secu-
rity Council. Another milestone came on 12 August 
2005 when Erdoğan capped a series of measures en-
hancing minority cultural rights by going to Diyarbakır, 
the main city of Turkey’s Kurdish region, where he 
acknowledged Turkey’s “Kurdish problem” and said it 
could only be solved through more democracy.  
As this brief overview indicates, Erdoğan and his 
colleagues focused their energies at this stage on do-
mestic reforms—deploying their electoral mandate as 
well as the EU’s accession criteria in order to consoli-
date civilian authority, to jumpstart a moribund econ-
omy that in 2000–2001 had experienced the worst fi-
nancial crisis since World War II, and to lay the 
groundwork for a resolution to the long-simmering 
Kurdish uprising. The most sensitive foreign policy is-
sues (above all Iraq) remained largely in the hands of 
the military, while the diplomats pursued Davutoğlu’s 
“zero-problems” approach, centered on containing re-
gional crises and pushing ahead with the EU accession 
process, in order to create a stable environment for the 
domestic political transition and economic recovery. 
Davutoğlu himself emphasized the “continuity” in Tur-
key’s foreign policy, for example in maintaining its “red 
lines” against Kurdish separatism in northern Iraq, ex-
plaining in 2004 that the overall priority was “to mini-
mize external threats as much as possible so that 
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sound reforms can be implemented at home” 
(Davutoğlu, 2013, pp. 90, 162). 
This combination of reform at home and crisis con-
trol abroad proved remarkably successful. Real Gross 
Domestic Product rose by an average of 6.8% annually 
between 2002 and 2007, leading the Financial Times to 
describe the five-year cumulative expansion as the 
“longest and most stable stretch of uninterrupted 
growth since at least 1970” and making Turkey the 
17th largest economy in the world (Boland, 2007, April 
2; Macovei, 2009, p. 10). A series of legal and adminis-
trative reforms expanded freedoms for both individuals 
(for example through the establishment of a Bureau for 
Review of Allegations of Human Rights Violations in 
2004) and for communal groups (for example with the 
initiation of news broadcasts in Kurdish and other mi-
nority languages on state television in 2004). As na-
tional elections in 2007 approached, however, Turkey’s 
Kemalist establishment moved to try to reverse the AK 
Party’s fortunes. 
Chief of Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt fired a major salvo in 
mid-February 2007, warning that the “Turkish Republic 
had not confronted as great risks, dangers and difficul-
ties since 1923” (Hürriyet Newspaper, 2007, February 
14). Speaking at the Istanbul War Academies two 
months later, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer elaborat-
ed, saying that “foreign forces” and “systemic pow-
ers”—annoyed that Turkey was maintaining its “Ata-
türkist structure” and resisting full incorporation into 
the “hegemony of the global system”—sought to de-
stroy Turkey’s sovereignty by engineering its transfor-
mation from a “secular republic” to a “democratic re-
public” and finally to a “moderate Islamic republic”. 
Sezer described his duty and that of the Constitutional 
Court as being to “balance and put the brakes on” the 
elected government’s “dictatorship of the majority” 
(Radikal Newspaper, 2007, April 14). The following day, 
a series of coordinated mass demonstrations, with 
chants of “No to America, no to the EU, down with the 
government”, got underway in Turkey’s largest cities. 
When the AK Party nominated Abdullah Gül later in 
April for president (to succeed Sezer), the General Staff 
posted a statement on its website asserting the Turkish 
Armed Forces’ determination to act as the defender of 
secularism. But the campaign failed, and the AK Party 
scored a crushing victory in the 22 July 2007 national 
elections, winning 47% of the popular vote (compared 
to 34% in 2002) and 341 of 550 parliamentary seats. 
Gül for his part overcame a series of legal challenges 
and was elected president by the new parliament in 
August.  
Turkey’s hardliners suffered a second setback seven 
months later, this time in foreign policy. Throughout 
2007, General Büyükanıt had been arguing for a mili-
tary incursion into northern Iraq in order to destroy the 
PKK and its Iraqi Kurdish backers once and for all. 
Erdoğan, by contrast, voiced reservations: “It is said 
that there are 500 terrorists in northern Iraq. There are 
5000 terrorists in Turkey’s mountains. Has the struggle 
against these 5000 terrorists inside Turkey been com-
pleted…that we should move to contending with the 
500 persons in northern Iraq?” (Radikal Newspaper, 
2007, June 13). Undeterred by Erdoğan’s evident desire 
to have the military assume full responsibility for the 
proposed operation, and despite repeated warnings by 
American officials against the idea, a series of artillery 
and air strikes across the border gave way to a full-
scale land invasion on 21 February 2008. On 27 Febru-
ary, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said: “It’s very 
important that the Turks make this operation as short 
as possible and then leave…I measure quick in terms of 
days…not months” (Oppel & Al-Ansary, 2008). On 29 
February, Turkish troops completed their withdrawal. 
The incursion weakened the AK Party’s opponents 
in two ways. First, the practical results—240 PKK fight-
ers and 27 Turkish soldiers killed according to Turkish 
officials; 5 Kurdish fighters and 130 soldiers killed ac-
cording to the PKK—fell so far short of expectations 
that it prompted expressions of disappointment and 
recrimination even from parties normally aligned with 
the military. Second, the failure of the operation re-
vealed the bankruptcy of the Kemalist approach to the 
Kurdish question, and opened the way for alternatives. 
In early March, Admiral William J. Fallon, the head of 
US Central Command, called on “the Turks” to reach 
“some kind of accommodation” with “this group” and 
“not just try to eliminate them militarily” (Reuters, 
2008, March 10). Secretary Gates reiterated the need 
“to try and address some of the civilian concerns 
among the Kurdish population...I think the real objec-
tive is to peel away from the hard-core terrorists those 
who might be reconciled and brought back into the po-
litical fold” (US Embassy in Ankara, 2008). 
Together the national elections of July 2007 and the 
Iraq debacle of February 2008 constituted a turning 
point that shifted the balance of power decisively be-
tween the AK Party and the Kemalist establishment. Al-
ready in late January 2008, following unprecedented 
leaks of documents detailing alleged coup plots by top 
military officers, a series of arrests and prosecutions 
got underway which would eventually put some 10% of 
all serving generals and about half of all admirals, as 
well as hundreds of civilian alleged co-conspirators, 
behind bars. Further leaks and revelations—variously 
blamed on more democratic elements in the Turkish 
Armed Forces seeking to purge their hard-liner col-
leagues, or on sympathizers of Fethullah Gülen’s Islam-
ist Hizmet movement within the police and judiciary—
leading to further arrests, forced retirements and res-
ignations, appeared to signal the effective defeat of the 
authoritarian secular-nationalist power structure. With 
the domestic consolidation phase successfully com-
pleted, then, Erdoğan and his colleagues could pursue 
their own priorities more freely, and in the process to 
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answer the questions raised by Ali Bulaç and many 
others about the true character of their political agen-
da. 
4. Transition Phase (2008–2011) 
Domestically, the further strengthened AK Party moved 
quickly toward reconciliation with the Kurds—the ob-
vious and indispensable first step for any meaningful 
reform agenda. On 11 March 2008, President Gül met 
with the leader of the Kurdish-based Democratic Socie-
ty Party (DTP), and later declared that no one, including 
the military, believed any longer that “this thing can be 
solved by arms” (Cemal, 2008, March 14). A few days 
later, a DTP parliamentarian reciprocated with an arti-
cle defending the AK Party against a final (and abortive) 
party closure case launched by the State Prosecutor, 
and calling for an alliance against the “anti-pluralistic, 
coup d’étatist, fascistic, neo-Unionist forces” (Tuğluk, 
2008, March 17). On 29 July 2009, Interior Minister 
Beşir Atalay unveiled a major initiative that came to be 
known as the “Kurdish Opening” entailing an array of 
further human rights and cultural reforms—prompting 
denunciations by the two main opposition parties, the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Ac-
tion Party (MHP). 
Externally, the most important development of this 
phase also aimed at Kurds. In the immediate aftermath 
of the failed military incursion of February 2008, the AK 
Party government undertook one of the most dramatic 
turnarounds in the history of Turkish foreign policy. Af-
ter decades of attempting to suppress Kurdish auton-
omy in northern Iraq, Turkey initiated a rapproche-
ment that bore the potential of upending the entire 
regional balance of power. A meeting between Tur-
key’s Special Envoy to Iraq Murat Özçelik and Nechir-
van Barzani, prime minister of the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG), on 2 May 2008 led to an an-
nouncement that Turkey would open a formal dialogue 
with the KRG. Several high-level meetings between the 
two sides ensued, culminating in an unprecedented 
meeting in Baghdad on 24 March 2009 between Presi-
dent Gül and Prime Minister Barzani, at which Gül de-
clared that once the PKK issue was resolved, “there are 
no bounds to what is possible: you are our neighbours 
and kinsmen” (De Bendern, 2009, March 25). The full 
import of Gül’s comments began to emerge in early 
2010, with the reopening of the Gaziantep-Mosul rail 
line, the opening of a Turkish consulate in Erbil, and the 
announcement by the KRG that it sought to export 
100,000 barrels of oil per day through Turkey.  
Just as the AK Party’s domestic Kurdish opening 
could easily be explained as part of a broader liberaliz-
ing political agenda, its moves in northern Iraq could 
also be justified in functionalist, liberal terms—for ex-
ample in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s repeated insistence that 
his government’s approach rested more on “economic 
interdependence” and “cultural influence” than on 
power or “deterrent superiority and threat” (Davutoğlu, 
2013, p. 302). The same could be said for other aspects 
of Turkey’s external relations during this period: the 
steady growth in the share of external trade in GDP 
from 43% in 2000 to 52% in 2008 to 58% in 2012 
(World Bank, n.d.); a proliferation of free-trade agree-
ments (from just 4 before 2002 to 11 by 2007 and 18 
by 2012) (Turkish Ministry of Economy, n.d.); infra-
structural integration with neighboring countries ex-
emplified by intensified transportation links (the Gazi-
antep-Mosul line as well as plans for a Gaziantep-
Aleppo fast train service and for reopening long-
disused links along the old Hijaz Railway; a dramatic in-
crease in Turkish Airlines flights, especially to the Mid-
dle East and the former Soviet Union) and by plans for 
a regional seven-country electricity grid (International 
Crisis Group, 2010, pp. 11-12); and: “Since 2009…a sys-
tematic policy of visa liberalization…[through] a series 
of bilateral visa-free agreements with countries in its 
neighborhood” (Evin et al, 2010, p. 19). Finally, further 
reinforcing this apparent embrace of regional interde-
pendence and integration, of soft rather than hard 
power, was Turkey’s pacific (“zero-problems”) stance 
during this period toward old rivals such as Russia, as 
reflected by its subdued response to the 2008 Russian-
Georgian war, and by the establishment of a bilateral 
“High-Level Cooperation Council” in May 2010. 
No wonder, then, that many observers believed a 
decisive shift from realpolitik to liberal integrationism 
had taken place in Turkish foreign policy. For some, this 
was cause for concern: one Turkish analyst complained 
that the AK Party government’s adherence to “liberal 
dogmas” and its “allergy” to “the use of force” had 
produced an “excessive optimism” that reached “Polly-
annaish” levels (Koç, 2010, pp. 3, 6). Foreign interpre-
tations were generally more favorable. The Interna-
tional Crisis Group noted the “win-win attitude which 
has become a catchphrase of Turkish diplomacy, by 
contrast with the zero-sum equation that traditionally 
has dominated the region” (International Crisis Group, 
2010, p. 13). Several Western authors in a 2012 edited 
volume welcomed the “sharp contrast” with earlier 
Turkish foreign policy (Tolay & Linden, 2012, p. 2), ar-
guing that whereas in the 1990s it had been “largely 
framed within a realist understanding”, now it sought 
“to promote peace and regional integration” (Tocci & 
Walker, 2012, pp. 35-36), and concluding that as “Tur-
key has become more democratic and Europeanized”, 
its external policies have grown “far more cooperative 
and constructive” (Tocci, 2012, p. 206). 
At the same time, however, other observers had 
begun to evince disquiet. An early indication came with 
the three-week Israeli assault on Gaza in December 
2008. Prime Minister Erdoğan, who had heretofore 
balanced his criticisms of Israel’s treatment of the Pal-
estinians with ongoing Turkish-Israeli economic and se-
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curity cooperation, adopted a much sharper tone, de-
nouncing Israel’s “inhumane actions” and, on 29 Janu-
ary 2009, engaging in his famous outburst against Is-
raeli President Shimon Peres at the Davos conference. 
Tensions reached a new peak on 31 May 2010 when Is-
raeli troops attacked a Turkish flotilla seeking to break 
Israel’s blockade of Gaza, killing nine activists. With an-
ti-Israeli sentiment at a peak in Turkey, the AK Party 
government’s downgrading of bilateral relations en-
hanced its popularity domestically as well as among 
the Arab masses. It was a different story on the gov-
ernmental level, however. The same 2010 ICG report 
referenced above also cited Syrian officials who wor-
ried that northern Syria “may slip into a Turkish sphere 
of influence”; an Egyptian official who complained that 
Erdoğan “seemed to get drunk on the response to Gaza 
statements”; a Saudi official who said: “They forget 
themselves. If this influence is going to spread again, 
this is very dangerous to me as an Arab”; and another 
Syrian official who warned: “We hear they have Otto-
man ambitions, or that they want to take this region 
under their umbrella. Who will let this happen? No-
body” (International Crisis Group, 2010, pp. 11, 21). 
Foreign Minister Davutoğlu continued to deny any 
“neo-Ottoman agenda” and to insist that the “key 
word defining Turkey’s relations with the Arab coun-
tries is not ‘hegemony’, but ‘mutual cooperation’” 
(MacLeod, 2012). As an unnamed Arab diplomat in An-
kara put it, however: “Turkey talks about everything, 
solving problems, multilateral economic cooperation, 
interdependence. The only problem is that they are the 
main beneficiary. They have the industries, the skilled 
labourers. We have only oil and gas in our favour” (In-
ternational Crisis Group, 2010, p. 11). The diplomat’s 
words suggest an alternative, less liberal, interpreta-
tion of AK Party foreign policy in which economic and 
cultural openness reflect economic and cultural dyna-
mism, and political engagement reflects political confi-
dence. As students of politics have long been aware, 
after all, hard and soft power go hand in hand, and—
pace Davutoğlu—openness is a natural characteristic of 
hegemony. Still, the full extent of the AK Party’s ambi-
tions would not become clear until after its next major 
milestone. 
5. Implementation Phase (2011–) 
The AK Party won its third straight national election on 
12 June 2011, once again raising its share of the total 
vote (from 34% in 2002, and 47% in 2007, to 50%). In 
his victory speech that night, Erdoğan declared the 
outcome “Sarajevo’s victory as much as Istanbul’s; Bei-
rut’s victory as much as Izmir’s; Damascus’ victory as 
much as Ankara’s; Ramallah’s, the West Bank’s, Jerusa-
lem’s, Gaza’s victory as much as Diyarbakır’s…Turkey 
has now attained a democratic freedom that is an ex-
ample for its region and the world” (Hürriyet Newspa-
per, 2011, June 12). Speaking at a gathering of Arab 
foreign ministers in Cairo three months later, Erdoğan 
hailed the Arab revolutions, called for “more freedom, 
democracy and human rights”, and added: 
We are elements of the same body and the same 
soul, for we constitute one great and noble family. 
Within a family, when joys are shared they in-
crease, and when sorrows are shared they de-
crease. Now we are at a historical turning point 
where we share our joys and sorrows at the highest 
level…The time has come for us, who with all our 
different languages share the same conceptual ge-
ography and destiny, to take charge of our shared 
future…The people of this region, who for centuries 
have inaugurated new epochs in human history and 
authored new innovations from science to litera-
ture, from art to philosophy, are not—I am sorry to 
say—where they should be today. But we possess 
more than sufficient potential to turn this around, 
and we view the developments taking place today 
from this perspective. (Turkish Prime Ministry, 
2011, 13 September) 
Erdoğan’s comments highlight not just the growing as-
sertiveness of AK Party discourse in this latest phase, 
but also the accelerating convergence between the 
party’s domestic and foreign agendas. Domestically, 
the elections were soon followed by the resignations of 
the chief of staff and three force commanders (unhap-
py about the ongoing coup plot investigations), and 
their replacement by a new military leadership that 
appeared intent on avoiding interference in political af-
fairs. Erdoğan then initiated a new round of dialogue 
with the PKK that included a meeting between his in-
telligence chief Hakan Fidan and imprisoned PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan in December 2012. These talks seem 
to have yielded significant results, as the PKK imple-
mented a ceasefire in March 2013, and began with-
drawing its fighters from Turkey into northern Iraq. 
Erdoğan for his part convened a “Wise Men” commis-
sion in March to begin educating the public about the 
peace initiative, unveiled a new round of cultural re-
forms in September, and on 16 November 2013 met 
with the Iraqi KRG leader Mas`ud Barzani in Diyarbakir. 
At each key juncture, the two sides cast their rec-
onciliation efforts as part of a broader reassessment of 
the regional disposition drawn up by the colonial pow-
ers during World War I, and exemplified by the 1916 
Sykes-Picot Agreement carving the Middle East into 
Western zones of influence. Speaking in Diyarbakır dur-
ing his meeting with Barzani, for example, Erdoğan de-
clared: “A century ago borders were drawn on this land 
with rulers, but they cannot draw borders on our affec-
tion. They cannot draw borders on our shared history, 
our shared civilization, our shared future” (CNN Türk, 
2013, November 16). Öcalan—somewhat startlingly for 
 Politics and Governance, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 28-42 38 
a Kurdish nationalist—made the same point in his 
speech announcing the ceasefire, when he lambasted 
“Western imperialism” for dividing the “Arab, Turkish, 
Persian and Kurdish communities” into “nation-states 
and artificial borders”, recalled their “common life un-
der the banner of Islam for almost a 1000 years”, and 
declared that “it is time to restore to the concept of ‘us’ 
its old spirit and practice” (CNN Türk, 2013, March 21). 
The centerpiece of the AK Party’s democratizing re-
forms from the very beginning—a Kurdish initiative 
that sought to replace monocultural secular national-
ism with a more expansive communal identity based 
on Islam—thus inevitably had external ramifications as 
well. First, it provoked unease in neighboring states 
which viewed it as a threat to their own sovereignty. 
Tensions with Iraq, for example, came to the fore in 
2011 as growing Turkish-KRG political and economic 
ties bypassed the Iraqi central government, with Turk-
ish officials increasingly prone to visit Iraqi Kurdistan 
without stopping in Baghdad first, and with plans mov-
ing ahead for direct oil exports from the KRG region to 
Turkey. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki accused Turkey 
of meddling in Iraqi affairs in December 2011, and of 
acting like a “hostile” state the following April. KRG 
leaders, by contrast, now called Turkey a “strategic 
partner” (Bozkurt, 2012, May 7). By mid-2012, Turkey’s 
traditional policy of propping up Baghdad against Iraq’s 
Kurds had undergone a total reversal: “Privately, Turk-
ish officials relate that if Baghdad strays far enough 
from Turkish interests, Ankara may decide to ‘take 
Kurdistan under its wings’. The KRG agrees—[Mas`ud] 
Barzani himself has reportedly suggested this sort of 
adoptive relationship…Both Kurdish and Turkish offi-
cials suggest that Ankara would be ready to defend the 
KRG if Baghdad moves with force to challenge Kurdish 
autonomy” (Çağaptay & Evans, 2012, p. 9). 
A second connection between the AK Party’s do-
mestic and foreign agendas emerged with the Arab 
upheavals of 2011. After a brief period of uncertainty, 
Erdoğan’s government aligned decisively with the pop-
ular uprisings against authoritarian secular nationalist 
regimes: Tunisia’s and Egypt’s almost immediately, 
then Libya’s, and finally—after a brief mediation at-
tempt—Syria’s as well. On 26 April 2012, Foreign Min-
ister Davutoğlu made the connection explicit in a 
speech to the Turkish parliament in which he noted 
“fundamental changes” in “regional conceptions of 
statehood, governance, and human geography”. Tur-
key’s resources, including its government’s credentials 
as architect of the “most important democratizing 
drive in the Turkish Republic’s history”, empowered it 
“to determine the future; to be the vanguard of a new 
idea, a new regional order”. While acknowledging that 
Turkey’s secular-nationalist opposition, preferring as it 
did a “Ba’thist political conception”, could not be “ex-
pected to understand us”, Davutoğlu declared that his 
government nevertheless intended “to direct the great 
transformation wave in the Middle East” (Turkish Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, April 26). Speaking less 
than a year later, on the same day as Abdullah Öcalan’s 
cease-fire speech, AK Party Deputy General-Secretary 
Süleyman Soylu made the link between his govern-
ment’s domestic and regional ambitions still more ex-
plicit when he said: “The third wave of democracy is very 
important for Turkey…We have been in a phase of re-
treat since 1699 [when the Treaty of Karlowitz marked 
the onset of Ottoman territorial decline]…[A]fter 300 
years we are rising once again. There is now a Turkey 
that can lay claim to the lands which we dominated in 
the past” (Milliyet Newspaper, 2013, March 21). 
The parallelism AK Party leaders drew between new 
conceptions of identity and representation at home on 
the one hand, and a new territorial order in the region 
on the other, drew precisely the responses Davutoğlu 
anticipated. At home, CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu 
denounced the government’s support for Syria’s rebels 
as “a framework that approaches treason…We do not 
want our children’s blood to be spilled in the Arab de-
serts” (CNN Türk, 2012, October 9). Abroad, President 
Assad of Syria opined that Erdoğan “thinks he is the 
new sultan of the Ottoman [sic] and he can control the 
region as it was during the Ottoman Empire under a 
new umbrella. In his heart he thinks he is a caliph” (RT 
Television, 2012, November 9). The Egyptian govern-
ment installed by a military coup that ousted President 
Muhammad Morsi, and strongly backed by Saudi Ara-
bia, for its part reacted to Turkish criticisms of its take-
over and subsequent crackdown on the Muslim Broth-
erhood by expelling Turkey’s ambassador in November 
2013. 
Davutoğlu’s argument illuminates the fundamental 
dichotomy he—and his colleagues—see between their 
worldview and the one they ascribe to their primary 
opponents, foreign and domestic alike. Speaking in Di-
yarbakır on 15 March 2013, he elaborated on his side’s 
alternative to the CHP’s “Ba’thist conception”, rejecting 
the “nationalist ideologies” with which the colonial 
powers had tried “to dismember us” and calling for a 
“new regional order” based on the restoration of an 
“older conception” of community (millet)—one that 
didn’t differentiate between “Turk and Kurd, Albanian 
and Bosnian”. Working together, “Turks, Kurds, Albani-
ans, Bosnians, [and] Arabs” would erase “artificially 
drawn maps” and “break the mold that Sykes-Picot 
drew for us” (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013, 
March 15). This is a vision that has been propounded 
consistently by Davutoğlu, Erdoğan and Gül since the 
early 1990s, as this article has sought to demonstrate, 
and as confirmed by recent content analyses of AK Par-
ty discourse revealing a quest for “great power identi-
ty” and a “politics of grandeur” (Demirtaş-Bagdonas, 
2014) even in cases where public opinion was not sup-
portive (Panayırcı & İşeri, 2014, pp. 67-68; see also 
Gürcan, 2013, pp. 361-364, on the pro-AK Party me-
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dia). It is a vision that extends, as Davutoğlu’s words 
indicate, well beyond the Middle East to Turkey’s 
western and northern frontiers as well: Erdoğan’s dec-
laration in Prizren in October 2013 that “Turkey is Ko-
sovo, Kosovo is Turkey”, for example, provoked angry 
demonstrations in Serbia (Baydar, 2013, October 28). It 
is a vision, in short, that was always bound to generate 
serious problems with the adherents of secular nation-
alism in all the countries that fall within its purview, as 
well as with external forces—such as Russia, Israel and 
Iran—which have their own geopolitical reasons to op-
pose the consolidation of regional power it threatens 
to bring about. 
5. Conclusion 
The preceding analysis has sought to reveal the paral-
lelism between the AK Party’s drive against authoritari-
an secular nationalism at home, and its attempt to uti-
lize both soft and hard power in pursuit of a new post-
nationalist regional order abroad, and thereby to indi-
cate the inaptness of calls—primarily from Turkish and 
Western liberals—that it abandon “neo-Ottomanism” 
and concentrate on its domestic reform agenda in-
stead. The same can be said of another line of criticism 
from an entirely different direction. In a series of col-
umns published in January 2014, in a newspaper reflect-
ing the views of Fethullah Gülen’s Hizmet movement, Ali 
Bulaç argued that the AK Party leaders’ “over-confident” 
and aggressive pursuit of their “neo-Ottoman delusions” 
is “un-Islamic” because it is predicated on Turkish lead-
ership (Bulaç, 2014, January 2, 2014, January 4). In Is-
lam, Bulaç asserted, leadership is assigned not to a par-
ticular nation but to the Islamic community (ümmet) as 
a whole, so considerations of power, history or geog-
raphy are irrelevant: even the most humble Muslim 
may be appointed ruler (Bulaç, 2014, January 6). 
This is one perspective in Islam, but it is not the on-
ly one. Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), for example, a leading 
representative of the “Islamic realist” tradition Bulaç 
had denounced in his 2010 book, identified two criteria 
for effective leadership. The first is legitimacy, meaning 
adherence to the prevailing normative ethos (Islam, 
obviously, but increasingly in today’s context democra-
cy as well). The other is power—a point Ibn Khaldun il-
lustrated by arguing, contrary to conventional opinion, 
that Quraysh, the Prophet’s clan, forfeited their claim 
to rule when they “became too weak to fulfill the du-
ties of the caliphate” (Muqaddima, 3.24). For Muslim 
realists, neither criterion can suffice without the other.  
From this perspective, the AK Party leaders’ appeal 
to Turkey’s hard and soft power resources is not only 
legitimate, but mandatory. As for legitimacy, their ad-
herence to Islam—and their consistent rejection of 
ethnic chauvinism—are evident. The question is, can 
they also maintain their democratic credentials? 
Erdoğan’s responses to the two unexpected challenges 
that confronted him in 2013—the protests that broke 
out in May following the proposed closing of a park in 
Istanbul, and the crisis with Fethullah Gülen’s move-
ment that got underway in December—are notewor-
thy. In both cases, Erdoğan and his allies interpreted 
the crises as the work of their traditional adversaries: 
foreign actors fearful of Turkey’s growing power and 
domestic secular-nationalist hardliners, now joined by 
Gülen’s rival Islamist movement. Their heavy-handed 
responses have prompted questions about whether 
the AK Party can sustain its role as a democratic “dom-
inant party” in the mode of Sweden’s Social Democrats 
or Italy’s and Japan’s Liberal Democrats, or whether it 
may yet succumb to the authoritarian current in Turk-
ish political culture (Keyman, 2014, pp. 24-25, 31; 
Çağla, 2012, p. 570).  
While it is indeed the case, as the more fair-minded 
among those who raise such questions acknowledge, 
that much of the recent anti-government activism has 
constituted a “reactionary response” by the AK Party’s 
traditional illiberal adversaries (Yel & Nas, 2013, pp. 
177, 178), Erdoğan and his allies do appear to have 
missed an important dimension of the emerging opposi-
tion: the genuine Western-style liberals who have here-
tofore remained marginal, but who are destined even-
tually to eclipse the authoritarian secular-nationalists on 
both the political and normative levels. This point was 
vividly illustrated to me by a conversation with an old-
school Kemalist who drove many students to the Gezi 
Park protests in the summer of 2013. He said that 
when he encouraged the students to give no quarter as 
they battled the police, they looked at him as if he was 
crazy—they just wanted to defend the park, not kill po-
licemen.  
The immediate challenge posed by such crises to 
the AK Party leaders will be to test their ability to dis-
tinguish between their old opponents and these new 
liberals, and to recognize that each requires a different 
response. Counter-attacking by politicizing the judiciary 
and law-enforcement agencies, or censoring news out-
lets and social media sites, can only undermine the AK 
Party’s democratic credentials, and hence its legitima-
cy, and hence its effectiveness at spearheading a new 
regional order. How artfully it deals with the looming 
flood tide of liberalism—philosophically and morally as 
well as politically—may well prove the ultimate chal-
lenge for the AK Party and for its attempt to formulate 
a credible Islamic-realist alternative. 
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